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Abstract: This essay addresses different patterns of the visualisation of the law. It examines how scholars 
attempt to depict, represent, and perform the law and its founding authority. It also focuses on the 
pragmatics of legal language: written and spoken standard legal English are pragmatically enriched within 
contexts where the law is interpreted, uttered, or performed. The linguistic notion of “context” discloses 
the interrelations between the agendas of law and power and reveals how the law conveys its content to 
the body politic as its ultimate addressee. It then proposes a renewed concept of legal linguistics. In order 
to determine the different ideologies underpinning the evolution of English legal language, as well as its 
prototypical forms of the visualisation of the law, three stages in the history of the English language will 
be examined: Late Middle English, Early Modern English, and Contemporary English. Each of these 
stages will be likened to the different parts of judicial proceedings. This will allow us to examine how 
English legal language has been used in a specific context, the trial, where the law is both uttered and 
performed.  
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Community is maintained or achieved – social disintegration is prevented or overcome – 
when men speak words that create bonds of social cohesion; without such words there 
can be no community. And we mean also that the community itself provides the sources 
of those words, makes them available to its members, in the language that it transmits. 
This is the paradox with which we started: that men create community by language, and 
that the community creates men by language. 
- Harold J. Berman, Law and Language, 59. 
 
 
1. “Law as Ideology” and “Law as Performance”: Forms and Functions of the 
Visualisation of the Law  
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“Visualising the law” can be included among the fields of research to which scholars with a background 
in either law or humanities have dedicated numerous analyses, and which are aimed at “depicting,” 
“representing,” or “performing” the law.1 Indeed, attempts at visualisation unavoidably involve “an 
interpretation of the law’s founding authority,” which is “self-critical, or self-reflective […] particularly 
when literature tries to critically challenge [such] authority and legitimacy as a discourse on truth and 
justice.”2 
This is the attitude of the law-and-literature movement in relation to the topic at stake. The 
foundations and legitimacy of the law are made “visible” and “ostensible” through mechanisms of 
representation and performance, which unveil the “source of legal authority,” as well as the “‘mystical’ 
moment of [its] performative self-authorization.”3 These mechanisms of representation also denote how 
jurists handle Roscoe Pound’s “sibylline leaves,” gather “the scattered prophecies of the past,” and turn 
the “oracles of the law” into that “body of dogma or systematized prediction which we call the law.”4 
This essay provides a scenario within which it is possible to conduct a broader examination of the 
notion of the visualisation of the law, i.e., of its ability to perform the most relevant legal function (i.e., 
conveying the meaning of the law) through written and spoken standard legal English, i.e., its traditional 
forms of representation. Political (and economic) powers indeed draw on standard language when it 
comes to enforcing their agenda. Governmental action may institutionalise legal language: institutional 
support thus has relevant linguistic implications, and legal language may become the “medium of national 
communication.”5 This is the case for written and spoken Standard English: the political and economic 
agendas that lie beneath legal documents and discourses are then conveyed and performed in contexts 
such as courtrooms and parliamentary debates.6 
Scholars have also found alternative forms of the visualisation of the law. Among them, I will focus 
on two patterns of representation. The first may be called “law as ideology”. This is a pictorial, graphic 
device that delivers an iconic visualisation of the law: “the practice of politics and the enactment of 
government as a type of aesthetics” 7  employ symbols, codes, marks, and other images that are 
traditionally associated with the attributes of power, i.e., the real and ultimate source from which law’s 
authority is deemed to emanate. “Law as ideology” is interested in depicting the authorial side of the law 																																																								
1 See, among others, Peter Goodrich, “Specula Laws: Image, Aesthetics, and Common Law,” Law and Critique, 2.2 (1991): 233-
254; Costas Douzinas and Lynda Neal (eds.), Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of Law (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1999); Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques and Entanglements (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2011), further references in the text abbreviated as DB. See also Peter Schneck, Rhetoric and Evidence: 
Legal Conflict and Literary Representation in U.S. American Culture (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), Chapter 1 of 
which is dedicated entirely to the “portrayal of law in literary fiction,” to “courtroom trial [as] the dominant form and focus 
of cultural representations of the law,” and to the “relation between [legal] reality and its representation.” 
2 Schneck, Rhetoric and Evidence, 19 and 18, respectively. 
3 Schneck, Rhetoric and Evidence, 18, 61 et seq. Paul Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution: Late Elizabethan Politics and the 
Theatre of Law (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2010), 2, also refers to the “mystical basis of the law’s authority.” 
Schneck and Raffield quote Michel de Montaigne, “On Experience,” in Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. and 
ed. Michael A. Screech (London: Penguin, 2003), 1216; Blaise Pascal, Thoughts, trans. William F. Trotter, ed. Charles W. Eliot 
(New York, NY: Collier, 1909-1914), Frag. 294; and Jacques Derrida, “Force of law: The mystical foundations of authority,” 
trans. Mary Quaintance, Cardozo Law Review 11.5-6 (1989-1990): 920-1045. See also Simon Glendinning, “Derrida and the 
Philosophy of Law and Justice,” Law and Critique 27.2 (2016): 187-203. 
4 Roscoe Pound, “The Path of the Law,” Harvard Law Review, 10.8 (1896-1897): 457-478, 457, 458.  
5 David Crystal, The Stories of English (London: Penguin, 2005), 222-223. 
6 On “the reciprocal transfer of meanings between speakers and listeners [as] the metabolism of language,” in general, and on 
“‘the communifying’ function of legal language in all societies where law exists – that is uttered in the context of legal 
activities,” (Harold J. Berman, Law and Language: Effective Symbols of Community, ed. John Witte, Jr. (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 38 and 69). Courtrooms and trials are prototypical contexts for legal interaction and performance of 
the law: see, among others, Jonathan Culperer and Merja Kytö, Early Modern English Dialogues: Spoken Interaction as Writing 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 10 et seq. On the constitutional context and the evolution of legal language, 
see Andrei Marmor, “The Pragmatics of Legal Language,” Ratio Juris 21.4 (2008), 423-452, 424-429. For the U.S. constitutional 
environment, see Berman, Law and Language, 133 et seq.; Pier Giuseppe Monateri, “Voice, Incarnation and the United States 
Supreme Court,” Pólemos 9.2 (2015): 341-356. For parliamentary debates as relevant legal linguistic contexts, see, among others, 
Anu Lehto, “Complexity in national legislation of the Early Modern English period,” Journal of Historical Pragmatics 11.2 (2010), 
277-300. 
7 Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution, 1.  
rather than in portraying the sequence of written sentences (the black-letter law) and spoken utterances 
(the interaction) that Roscoe Pound defined as the “law in the books” and the “law in action.”8 
Like written and spoken standard legal English, figurative representation be interpreted in different 
ways that go beyond the “literal” meaning of “pictorial” illustration. This means that “law as ideology” 
proposes a type of visualisation that is closer to implicatures, i.e., the interpretation of meaning that linguists 
work out in pragmatics. Indeed, pragmaticists do not confine their interpretation of legal language to the 
original intent of the lawmaker or to the ratio legis of authoritative provisions; on the contrary, they “go 
further and ask what is hinted at by an utterance in its particular context, what the sender’s ‘agenda’ is.”9 
Iconic implicatures are apparent when we consider how representations and portraits of the English 
monarchs represented the law in the Middle Ages and in the late Elizabethan period. The King was 
indeed depicted as the “fountain of justice”: he was a key figure in the administration and enforcement 
of the law, as well as the “general conservator of the peace of the kingdom,” as Blackstone astutely wrote 
in his Commentaries.10 The same holds true as far as the iconography and the “power of the clothing” of 
Elizabeth I is concerned.11 The cultural context of the late sixteenth century saw two powerful and 
opposing rhetorical instruments used for political persuasion: on the one hand, Elizabeth I encouraged 
a “politics of aesthetics,” which relied on royal portraiture, i.e., the most “visible, tangible form of the 
mystical basis of the law’s authority”:12  
 
Figurative art, in the form of royal portraiture, remained a dominant propagandist tool […] insofar as the 
authority of law has been linked to the affective capacity of the image to control and direct the gaze of its 
audience, the depiction of the monarch as Imago Dei remained a potent rhetorical instrument.13 
 
On the other hand, this pictorial policy intertwined with the rise of poetic drama – an effective “speaking 
picture,” according to Edmund Spenser.14 Hence, portraiture and drama represented strategic means for 
depicting and discussing political issues, as well as conveying the Queen’s commitment to the new 
constitutional context of the emerging sovereign nation state.15 
This “iconology of power”16 was inherent to the Tudors’ government: the representation of the 
Queen was indeed part of the metaphor of her political agenda, as well as the device used to uphold the 
establishment of her new authorial constitutional order. 17  Furthermore, the pictorial and theatrical 
representation of the Queen was aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of such authorial rule vis-à-vis the 
body politic. As Elizabeth I held on 12 November 1586, when delivering one of her most famous 
speeches before Parliament: 
 																																																								
8 Roscoe Pound, “Law in the Books and Law in Action,” America Law Review 44 (1910): 12-36. 
9 Patrick Griffiths, An Introduction to English Semantics and Pragmatics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 7. See also 
Marmor, “The Pragmatics of Legal Language,” 424. 
10 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Notes selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, 
Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others, Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood. In 
Two Volumes (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1893), 1.266. 
11 See Kendrick Smaellie, “Dressed to the Nines: Queen Elizabeth I and the Power of Her Clothing,” Student Library Research 
Awards. Paper 7 (2014). Available at http://repository.wellesley.edu/library_awards/7. See also Susan Doran, “Virginity, 
Divinity and Power: The Portraits of Elizabeth I,” in Thomas F. Freeman and Susan Doran (eds.), The Myth of Elizabeth 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 171-199; Ann R. Jones and Peter Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Paul Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England: Justice and 
Political Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Daniela Carpi, “The Language of Clothing and The Law,” 
Pólemos 10.1 (2016): 143-155, 147-148. 
12 Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution, 1. 
13 Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution, 2. 
14 Edmund Spenser, “The Defence of Poesy” and Selected Renaissance Literary Criticism, ed. Gavin Alexander (London: Penguin, 
2004), 10. Indeed, “painting can be described as a discourse where brush strokes represent the phonemes constituting the 
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15 See John A. Guy (ed.), The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995). 
16 Carpi, “The Language of Clothing,” 147-148; Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution, 15, 82, 104-112. 
17 See Stephen Greenblatt, “Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and Its Subversion,” in Glyph 8: John Hopkins Textual 
Studies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1981), 40-61; Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution, 18-50. 
We princes, I tell you, are set on stages, in the sight and view of all the world duly observed. The eyes of many 
behold our actions; a spot is soon spied in our garments; a blemish quickly noted in our doings. It behooveth 
us therefore to be careful that our proceedings be just and honourable.18 
  
The second pattern through which the visualisation of the law is attained is the “law as performance.” 
This mainly focuses on the practice of law, as well as on how the proliferation of visual images may 
influence its legitimacy, authority, interpretation, and enforcement. Richard K. Sherwin’s seminal work 
When Law Goes Pop astutely points out how intense the “influence of the visual mass media on the way 
trial lawyers represent their clients’ interests” is.19 When it goes pop, the law changes functions and 
meaning: it “yields to the media’s logic. As a result, its capacity to serve as a necessary brake upon popular 
passions and impulses is lost” (LP, 171) and therefore turns into “an increasingly popular form of cultural 
postmodernism (LP, 31). 
The law is then performed as if it were represented either on-stage or on-screen. The consequences 
are threefold. First, the practice of the law is now treated like a performing art: “fictional methods are in 
common use within the courtroom” (LP, 47). Second, “the ways in which law goes pop coincide with a 
broader pattern of cultural change” (LP, 39), and this has affected how we conceive of the law: “any 
attempt to understand adequately [how the] law works in contemporary society requires that popular 
culture be taken into account” (LP, 8), because “mass media today are […] the primary if not the exclusive 
source of the public’s knowledge about law, lawyers, and the legal system as a whole” (LP, 17). Third, 
such image-based representation of the law has skirted the line between fiction and reality, and this side-
stepping of the line has been amplified by the increasing impact of communication technologies in the 
administration of justice and in courtroom trials:  
 
In a variety of ways law today is being visually projected inside the courtroom: including day-in-the-life videos 
in personal injury cases, reality-based police surveillance videos, civilian and news journalist videos […] and 
digitized reconstructions of images they contain, computer graphics, digitally reconstructed accidents and crime 
re-enactments, and video montage […] the latter montage has even replaced an attorney’s live summation 
before the jury (LP, 33-34). 
 
“Law as performance” thus has several traits in common with “law as ideology”: both visualise the 
authorial side of the law; both are aimed at conveying its content and meaning. However, the meaning 
of the law does not stem from a textual, i.e., semantic, interpretation of legal provisions; rather, it is 
inferred from the legal language “that is uttered in the context of legal activities,”20  including the 
courtroom discourse to which Richard Sherwin, Harold J. Berman, and the historical pragmaticists have 
dedicated their studies,21 Again, both forms of visualisation go further and ask what is hinted at by an 
utterance in its particular context, what is “law’s implicit or hidden meaning”(LP, 11). It is evident that 
this type of interpretation requires  
 
a critical sensitivity to the different ways law masks meaning and power […] At the same time, we must attend 
to the ways the irrational subtextual, and symbolic play of rage and desire flow through law’s discursive practices 
and strategies [including trial and courtroom discourse] (LP, 11). 
 
 																																																								
18 Sir John E. Neale (ed.), Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments 1584-1601, 2 vols. (London: Cape, 1957), 2.119.  
19 Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop: The Vanishing Line between Law and Popular Culture (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 7. Further references in the text abbreviated as LP. 
20 Berman, Law and Language, 69, according to whom “[t]he vocabulary of law is part of legal syntax, that is, the arrangement 
of legal terms in phrases and sentences.” On semantics as “the study of word meaning and sentence meaning, abstracted away 
from contexts of use,” see Griffiths, An Introduction to English Semantics, 15.  
21 See Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, 41-72, and Berman, Law and Language, 69. Among pragmaticists, see Culperer and Kytö, 
Early Modern English Dialogues, 49-59, 69; 326-360; Esperanza Rama-Martínez, “Courtroom interaction between 1760 and 
1860,” Journal of Historical Pragmatics 14.2 (2013): 236-262; Barbara Kryk-Kastowsky, “Historical courtroom discourse: 
Introduction,” Journal of Historical Pragmatics 7.2 (2006): 163-179; Dawn Archer, “(Re)initiating strategies: Judges and defendants 
in Early Modern English courtrooms,” Journal of Historical Pragmatics 7.2 (2006): 181-211; Barbara Kryk-Kastowsky, 
“Impoliteness in Early Modern English courtroom discourse,” Journal of Historical Pragmatics 7.2 (2006): 213-243; Irma 
Taavitsainen and Andreas H. Jucker, “Twenty years of historical pragmatics,” Journal of Historical Pragmatics 16.1 (2015): 1-24. 
2. From Traditional Forms of the Visualisation of the Law to the Law “Going Pop” 
… and Back Again to Written Standard Legal English 
 
“Law as ideology” and “law as performance” are thus strategic patterns for representation of the law. 
Both conceive of representation as a mechanism that is capable of undraping the meaning of the law 
encoded in legal vocabulary and phraseology, as well as of disclosing the mutual interrelations between 
power and the law. These types of interrelations emerge, on the one hand, within the legal contexts where 
the law and the legal language are uttered, represented, and performed, and, on the other hand, the power 
agenda beneath legal language is usually conveyed by means of communication (hard copy, courtrooms, 
digitalisation, audio-visual), the aim of which is disseminating the representation of the law. 
When it comes to exploring how the law communicates its content within legal contexts, both types 
of representation encourage the examination of sources of legal meaning that are different from the 
classical textual legal genres. To this extent, legal documents, transcripts of courtroom trials, bills and 
writs, petitions, and law reports are usually numbered among the genres that convey written and spoken 
legal language.22  
Albeit semantics and syntax applied to legal documents are still essential vehicles for interpreting the 
law’s communicative content, it is evident that only the context, in general, and the legal context, in 
particular, enrich legal language and therefore disclose how multifarious “the pragmatic aspects of language 
use” are. 23  Further, the context acts as a “background that is common knowledge between the 
conversational parties,” and this also helps in decoding what implicature is hinted at by a legal text or 
utterance in a specific legal context.24  
This is particularly true as far as “law as ideology” is concerned: the symbolic depiction of the 
authorial attributes of power conveys power’s agenda and its quest for legitimacy. The relationship 
between power and the law is thus made explicit and directed at the body politic: within the broader 
landscape of the portrait – which assumes the constitutional legal order as its scenario – the body politic 
is indeed the ultimate addressee of the prescriptive content of the law. Once it has dismissed its iconic 
camouflage, the law appears as if it were the ancilla domini. This also means that power sets not only its 
own agenda, but also the content of the law, and therefore the meaning that the law has to convey. “Law 
as performance” also rejects the possibility of the “autonomy of the law” from the context in which it is 
uttered or performed.25 As Sherwin astutely points out, its doctrines, language, and methods are indeed 
not self-sufficient: 
 
Law is everywhere. It is in law office in conversations between lawyers and clients, and between lawyers arguing 
or negotiating with other lawyers. It’s in the minds of judges, clerks, bureaucrats, and jurors. And it’s on the air 
– on television, film, and computer screens in court and out” (LP, 10-11). 
 
Indeed, the skills of lawyers are represented through commercial advertising; and this also explains why, 
when the law goes pop, this type of advertising has become the most common form of representation of the 
law.26 Because of its inherence to popular culture, advertising is the mode of communication that the 
audience is most familiar with, and it therefore ensures constant coarse tuning between the societal 																																																								
22 On legal textual genres, see Matti Rissanen, “Standardisation and the language of early statutes,” in The Development of Standard 
English 1300-1800: Theories, Descriptions, Conflicts, ed. Laura Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 117-130, 
118-120. For witness depositions and trial records, see Culperer and Kytö, Early Modern English Dialogues, 49-59; Kryk-
Kastowsky, “Impoliteness in Early Modern English courtroom discourse,” 214; Merja Kytö, Terry Walker, and Peter Grund, 
“English witness depositions 1560-1760: An electronic text edition,” ICAME Journal 31 (2007): 65-86. 
23 Marmor, “The Pragmatics of Legal Language,” 424. On the relevance on the legal context, see, among others, Culperer and 
Kytö, Early Modern English Dialogues, 61 et seq. 
24 On the different types of pragmatic and semantic interpretation, see Griffiths, An Introduction to English Semantics, 6-9; 
Marmor, “The Pragmatics of Legal Language,” 424-425.  
25 For an account of how the autonomy of law was challenged in the U.S. legal environment from the 1960s onwards, see 
John Witte, Jr., and Christopher J. Manzer, “Introduction,” in Harold J. Berman, Law and Language: Effective Symbols of 
Community, ed. John Witte, Jr. (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 135, 3 et seq.  
26 See Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, 26. 
context that forges popular culture and its audience, as well as fine-tuning between that culture and the 
law. 
Legal textual genres and spoken legal utterances are still relevant forms of visualisation of the law. 
This is evident as far as written legal English is concerned. To this extent, I cannot deny the relevance of 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic taxonomies when devising a study on English as a form of visualisation 
of the law: indeed, the distinction drawn between langue and parole is applicable to its diachronic analysis.27 
The concept of langue28 is capable of encompassing patterns of legal representation referring to past times 
when it is impossible to resort to other technical devices in order to record and preserve the spontaneous 
speech of defendants and witnesses in courtroom trials.29 It follows that transcripts of legal proceedings, 
witness depositions, and parliamentary debates act as iconic representations of a language that we cannot 
otherwise record. The same holds true for the language and the spelling of laws and statutes, which is 
diachronically immutable and therefore  
 
characterised by neutrality and generality; it avoids subjective and personal attitudes and a strong regional 
marking, to ensure correct and unambiguous transmission of information it must be conservative in its choice 
of structure and lexis and hostile to stylistic variation.30 
 
And yet, these features “represent anonymous authority and power,”31 which may be pragmatically 
enriched within the legal context and by external factors, such as political and economic ones, which may 
thus challenge the meaning of the legal lexicon, and therefore impose a new sense (its own parole) on 
existing lexical items within the actual legal context.32  
Furthermore, letters, lexical items, mechanisms of affixation, phrases, and sentences are all symbols33 
whose prescriptive meaning stems from the interaction of semantic knowledge with the knowledge of 
the world, i.e., between power structures, contexts, and textual genres that play a key role in conveying 
the content of sentences and utterances. In addition, we have already said that written transcriptions are 
historically the most common forms of visualisation of the law, and this still holds true when it is 
impossible to resort to other technical devices in order to record and preserve the spontaneous speech 
of defendants and witnesses in courtroom trials.34 As a form of visualisation of the law, language then 
reveals the relationship between politics and language: the assumption is one of the key arguments when 
it comes to determining which features allow a local variety of English to become the standard language. 
This is the case of U.S. English, where the colonial lag and diglossic situation (a high English variety vis-
à-vis several dialects spoken by the colonists) were noticeably affected by a wave of “linguistic 
democratisation”: a “socio-political role of language […] was [thus] relevant in the building of the USA 
as a nation.”35 When founding an independent nation, political power has its institutions and its language; 																																																								
27 See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course de linguistique générale, publié par Charles Bally and Albert Séhehaye avec la collaboration 
de Albert Riedlinger (Paris: Payot & Rivage, 1914). See also Berman, Law and Language, 37 fn 5; Culperer and Kytö, Early 
Modern English Dialogues, 4. 
28 Whereas parole is the speech used by real people, langue refers to “the more abstract systems of linguistic signs”: Culperer 
and Kytö, Early Modern English Dialogues, 4.  
29 This is why pragmatic markers abound in trial records and depositions: see Culperer and Kytö, Early Modern English Dialogues, 
361 et seq.  
30 Rissanen, “Standardisation and the language of early statutes,” 120. See also Anu Lehto, “Complexity in national legislation,” 
278 et seq. See also Culperer and Kytö, Early Modern English Dialogues, 9: “Historical pragmatics […] faces an apparent obstacle 
in that our knowledge of the spoken interaction of the past is confined to what can be gleaned from written records.” 
31 Rissanen, “Standardisation and the language of early statutes,” 121. 
32 Indeed, “[i]n relation to historical legal documents […] the audience and function can change in the course of time. As an 
example, Parliamentary Rolls were mainly meant as record keeping for administrative use before the late fifteenth century, but 
when printing of statutes was introduced the acts came to be addressed to people outside the Parliament”: Lehto, “Complexity 
in national legislation,” 282. Taavitsainen and Jucker, “Twenty years of historical pragmatics,” 5-7, highlight the shift from De 
Saussure’s “langue” to “parole” in historical pragmatics. 
33 See Berman, Law and Language, 65. 
34 See Charles Barber, Early Modern English (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 30. 
35 See Gabriella Mazzon, “The ideology of the standard and the development of Extraterrritorial Englishes,” in Laura Wright, 
The Development of Standard English 1300-1800: Theories, Descriptions, Conflicts, ed. Laura Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000): 73-92, 75-76. On the ideological foundations of American English, see Richard W. Bailey, Speaking American: A 
History of English in the United States (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6-15. 
the voice of the people will, then, be subsequently spoken by the political branches, as well by the judiciary 
(the U.S. Supreme Court), as Harold J. Berman and Pier Giuseppe Monateri have astutely pointed out.36 
This is apparent in Noah Webster’s lexicographic studies, the Dictionary of the American Language37 and the 
Dissertations on the English Language. The United States required both constitutional and linguistic 
codification: “as an independent nation, our honor requires us to have a system of our own, in language 
as well as in government. Great Britain […] should no longer be our standard.”38  
There is, then, a type of visualisation of the law that is capable of capturing the ontological excess of 
power: although it is evident that the “uncanny presence of the law” may be embodied and conveyed by 
all means of communication and representation, the prototypical one still relies on linguistic patterns 
(DB, 43, 47). In this respect, written language backs the semantic ostension of the ultimate source of power. 
This is apparent as far as the common-law legal system is concerned. Not only did the democratisation 
of American English favour the Americanisation of the common law and its translation “into some form 
of a written code, or digest, which would be concise and comprehensive enough” under the authored 
text of the U.S. Constitution,39 but the legitimacy and sovereignty of the ancient English constitution also 
entailed the idea of laws enacted in the best interests of English subjects. This was strictly associated with 
Aristotle’s “good governance” of the polis and with the constitution as a social contract based “on the 
recognition of community, association or friendship for “the creation or maintenance of the polis” itself,40 
which emerged as an English constitutional innovation “from both the political quarrel between the 
crown and Parliament and the religious battle over episcopacy and presbytery.”41 According to Sir John 
Fortescue, such principles stemmed from the role of a  
 
king ruling his people politically, because he himself is not able to change the laws without the assent of his 
subjects nor to burden an unwilling people with [a] strange imposition, so that, ruled by laws that they 
themselves desire, they freely enjoy their goods, and are despoiled neither by their own king nor any other.42  
 
The assumption is particularly apparent when we consider those ancient legal documents where symbolic 
or iconic elements complement the written representation of the law: among others, the documents 
released by the Chancery and by the King’s Privy Seal, which are now reproduced and collected in the 
seminal work An Anthology of Chancery English edited by John H. Fisher, Malcolm Richardson, and Jane L. 
Fisher or in the Statutes of the Realms collected in the Rotuli Parliamentorum and now partially stored in the 
Helsinki Corpus.43 Among them, we can mention the signet letters of the English Kings, in general, and 
of Henry V, in particular, to which linguists devoted their studies.44 The iconology of the written language, 																																																								
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44 The Signet Letters are “epistolary in form, [and are] either letters of instruction by the King or some other official, or 
petitions by individuals or institutions to the King, the Lord Chancellor, the Council, the Parliament”: Fisher, Richardson and 
Fisher (eds.), An Anthology of Chancery English, 5-16 and 84-194, for the reproduction of the Signet Letters, Later Signet and 
Privy Seals. See also Malcom Richardson, “Henry V, the English Chancery, and Chancery English,” Speculum 55 (1980): 726-
which reached its peak in these documents and legal texts, displayed a threefold attitude: it was an 
authorial linguistic symbol, a marker of power, as well as one of the earliest uses of “English as official 
writing” capable of conveying the King’s agenda.45 
To this extent, Fisher, Richardson, and Milroy uphold that Henry V’s Signet Letters are “the most 
influential [documents] in establishing the convention” of what we now call “Chancery Standard”: 46 this 
expression was first used by Samuels in 1960,47 and it refers to a trend towards the uniformity of the 
written language, as well as to the emergence of the early attested form of Standard English, which is also 
known as “Chancery English.” There is, then, recourse to what Fisher calls “chancery hand,”, a form of 
international business handwriting originating from the Italian chancelleries and eventually merged with 
the native English cursive via the influence of the French Royal Chancery.48  
One of the most relevant features of the Signet Letters is the elevated degree of homogenisation and 
standardisation attained as regards their style and language. According to linguists, the use of a standard 
language by the political power, in general, and by the public administration, in particular,49 is one of the 
markers of standardisation. The Signet Letters can thus be considered the prototypical form of visualisation 
of the relationship between law and power, and the written text conveys the prescriptive meaning of the 
King’s command as part of his political agenda.50  
These letters were indeed written in response to petitions to the King as the fountain of justice: the 
King complements the written command with the royal seal, i.e., the symbol that corroborates the 
authenticity and truthfulness of the document where his supreme authority is visualised. The King’s 
command is then mediated by a specific style: it is the chancery hand emanating through the hands of 
“six scribes whose names are signed, and perhaps as many as thirteen others whose hands can be 
distinguished.”51 This did not prevent the King from contributing to the standardisation of the (legal) 
English language through his personal usage and style. Indeed, the Signet Letters already exhibit 
orthographic, lexical, and morphologic characteristics that would be preserved in the subsequent phases 
of the English language: the use of that as a demonstrative, the lack of inflected infinitive (i.e., without 
the suffix –en), the use of do/doo as an auxiliary verb, and so forth.52 
 
 
3. Performing the Law through Spoken Varieties of Legal English  
 
In the previous paragraphs, we noted that “law as performance” rejects the possibility of the “autonomy 
of the law” from the context in which it is uttered or performed. This means that legal research should 
focus mainly on sources of legal meaning and visualisation of the law where the written text is 
pragmatically enriched by the context.53 This absence of “autonomy of the law” requires one to go 
beyond the black-letter law, as well as the words of legislators, jurists, and administrative officials, and 
therefore to study and perform the law in specific legal contexts. 																																																								
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However, the lack of autonomy of the law is not usually confined to written, visualised language; it 
usually refers to the spoken variety of the English language that falls under the umbrella of English for 
special purposes. Linguists, however, have challenged the possibility of setting such a standard spoken 
language.54 On the one hand, they argue, uniformity often concerns written varieties of the language: they 
are usually indebted with language policy and language ideology and get institutionalised by political and 
governmental power, which controls the means for its dissemination. 55  On the other hand, 
standardisation of writing proceeded faster “than standardisation of speech,”56 and the “most palpable 
manifestation of the standard is not in the speech community at all, but in the writing systems.”57  
From this, however, it does not follow that it is not possible to deliver a visual representation of the 
law through its spoken utterances. “To tell the history of a language is, or should be, to tell the history of 
all the manifestations of that language: all its spoken dialects and all its written and spoken registers”:58 
this entails that the history of standard spoken English is particularly sensitive to the pragmatic context, 
in general, and of legal English, in particular, and therefore it may complement the history of the written 
language. Furthermore, the entire history of standardisation is pervaded by the “rise of accent [and 
speech] as a social symbol,” as Lynda Mugglestone has astutely stressed.59 The concern with speaking 
properly is intimately likened to the oral version of English: the “Standard English Speech” that was 
outlined by Hart in 1907;60 Received Pronunciation (RP) and “Estuary English,” which have acted as a 
true linguistic performance promoting English through radio, cinema, and television.61 
Additional arguments support spoken language as a form of standardised visualisation in the 
contemporary imaged-based practice of law. Spoken legal English is usually uttered and performed by 
lawyers in courtrooms, and the law thus goes pop because of the “influence of popular culture and the 
need for maximizing the effective of communication often requires emulating family patterns [TV fiction] 
in which relevant meaning are formed and conveyed” (LP, 26). 
Sometimes, it is necessary to preserve spontaneous speech. Spoken legal language can be captured 
either by writing it down or by recording or filming performances and utterances in courtrooms –the 
former has, for centuries, been the only way to visualise the law performed in trials. This has been astutely 
emphasised by Charles Barber as regards early Modern English:62 verbatim transcription is necessary 
when we want to safeguard the precise words that are alleged to have been used by the parties in 
courtrooms and parliamentary debates. The written record attempts to preserve verbatim debates and 
depositions, and to reproduce the context in which the law was uttered, visualised, and eventually 
performed.63  
One of the most remarkable examples of how transcripts preserve the performance of legal language 
is represented by the trial of King Charles I in 1649. The transcripts challenge James I and Charles I’s 
continuous appeal to scripture to justify their power and the sacrosanct nature of the royal prerogative 
vis-à-vis the ancient common-law constitution, according to which the King faces lawful limits to his 																																																								
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monarchic governance in favour of the freedoms of his subjects.64 “Against the constitutional dilemma 
raised by competing claims for royal prerogative and the extensions of parliamentary power,”65 the 
records depict a sovereign (the King) who is sentenced to death by the Lord President on behalf of a 
new intangible sovereign, whose uncanny presence and political rule derive now from the consent of the 
body politic. The excerpt is an impressive pièce, where the law is solemnly and tragically uttered and 
performed. At the end of the trial, the King “tries in vain to make a speech to the court after the 
sentence”: 
  
Lord President For all which Treasons and Crimes this Court doth adjudge, That the said Charles Stuart, as a 
Tyrant, Traitor, Murderer, and a Public Enemy, shall be put to Death, by the severing [of] his Head from his 
Body.” 
(After the Sentence [is] read, the Lord President said, This Sentence now read and published, is the Act, 
Sentence, Judgment, and Resolution of the whole Court. 
Here the Court stood up, as assenting to what the President said.) 
King. Will you hear me a word, Sir? 
Ld. President. Sir, you are not to be heard after the Sentence. 
King. No, Sir! 
Ld. President. No, Sir; by your favour, Sir. Guard, withdraw [your] Prisoner. 
King. I may speak after the Sentence——By your Favour, Sir, I may Speak after the Sentence ever. 
By your Favour, (Hold!) the Sentence, Sir— 
I say, Sir, I do—— 
I am not suffered for to speak: Expect what Justice other People will have.66  
 
But spoken language also has traits in common with “law as ideology.” In this respect, political power 
not only implements its political and legal agenda by relying on the pragmatics of the law, on its ability 
to gain authority in the specific context where the law is performed; it also resorts to sociolinguistic 
factors, such as the prestige of a spoken variety. This is the language of the court: John Palsgrave’s 
Leclarcissement de la langue francoyse (1530) considers it the place “where best englysshe is spoken”, as does 
John Hart’s Orthographie, conteyning the due order and reason, howe to write or paint thimmage of mannes voice, most 
like to the life of nature (1569). George Puttenham’s The Arte of English Poesie (1589) esteems the court’s 
spelling the “purest language in the country,” which poets and “those who whish to advance in life 
consider it to be in their interests to use [its] standard-like forms.”67  
 
Nor in effect any speach vsed beyond the riuer of Trent, though no man can deny but theirs is the purer English 
Saxon at this day, yet it is not so courtly nor so currant as our Southerne English is, no more is the far Westerne 
mans speach: ye shall therefore take the vsuall speach of the Court, and that of london and the shires lying 
about London within ix. miles.68 
 
The King’s speech thus implements his aesthetics of the law, and can also be considered the most 
sophisticated form for its visualisation. It is what Sherwin calls “aniconic images,” which “present 
themselves as visual, but they actually point to the unseen,” since the “source of an aniconic image derives 
from an invisible source,” i.e., the voice and the utterances of the King’s power and agenda (DB, 16).  
 
 
4. An Interdisciplinary Assessment: Legal Linguistics between Law, Language, 
and Power 
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Written and spoken varieties of standard legal English are, then, forms of visualisation of the law. In this 
regard, however, the study of legal language is limited to neither the language’s system of sounds nor to 
the lexicon, grammar, and syntax. The analysis necessarily goes beyond the structure of words and 
sentences and encompasses the study of the meaning the language conveys. We must bear in mind that 
legal English semantics and pragmatics have to do with the content of specific legal texts and contexts, 
and that this content is the authoritative meaning of the law, i.e., a meaning that may be inferred by legal 
sentences and utterances. Such meaning thus rests on the authority of the law, which is construed so as 
to preserve the body politic and avoid its dissolution. 
Such authoritative and prescriptive meaning is closely related to the ultimate source of legitimacy of 
the legal order: its provisions, which are enacted by the various political branches, demand to be observed 
because their ultimate source of legitimacy is political power. When assessing the pragmatics of legal 
language, we necessarily interpret legal provisions and utterances in order to ascertain which legal 
implicatures are hinted at by the law. To put it another way, we have to capture the meaning and the 
agenda that lie beneath the norms in light of the contextual and background information, i.e., the context 
of the representation of the law. 
These kinds of pragmatic implicatures are a field of research that semantics and pragmatics and legal 
studies share. I call this “legal linguistics.” In this respect, I will not concentrate on the relationship 
between law and linguistics: in-depth analyses have already been dedicated to the topic, as well as to its 
applicability to several sub-fields of the discipline, such as forensic studies.69 Nor will I limit my analysis 
to the language of the law: renowned scholars have examined the topic with precision with a background 
in the history of English law, such as Maitland and Berman,70 and linguists have done the same with legal 
English, examining how it has changed over time and how these changes affect its structures and the 
contexts of language use.71 
Both legal and linguistic studies consider legal linguistics to be part of their respective domains. I, on 
the other hand, see it as a field of research where law and language overlap. Like roof tiles, law and language 
overlap: “language is individualized by context and by the speaker, who gains meaning, identity, 
understanding, and direction through the experience of language.”72 To this extent, legal linguistics is an 
interdisciplinary assessment, where linguistics and legal studies jointly examine the implied, authoritative 
meaning hinted at by spoken and written legal language within the historical, cultural, political, and social 
contexts where the law is practised. When assessing language as a form of visualisation of the authoritative 
meaning of the law, it is evident that we must necessarily take into account the content of the law, as well 
as the relationship between the agenda of power and the authority of the law. Thus, the legitimacy and 
meaning of the law have to be necessarily carved out of the specific legal textual genres that are the loci 
where the agenda of the law is embodied and represented. 
If we want to capture the law’s authoritative meaning and the policies that lie beneath the legal 
language, we have to turn to the different contexts in which the law is performed. These are forms of 
visualisation of the law that represent the authorial side of the power and reveal the relations between 
power and the law that are hinted at by the language. Indeed, language standardisation may be considered 
a part of the authorial side of the law: 
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The more stable and enduring a society becomes, the more regular become its administrative procedures. Part 
of the process of regularizing the procedures is the standardizing of the official language in which they are 
transacted and recorded. The official language thus very early achieves a regular written form.73  
 
When conveying the prescriptive content of the law, language becomes standardised by power in order 
to ensure “correct and unambiguous transmission of information,” as well as “maximum 
disambiguation.”74 If we consider that institutionalised language, i.e., spelling, is “wholly a matter of written 
language [and] independent of meaning,”75 it is evident that a single provision may visualise and convey 
different meanings and contents of the law. The meaning of the law will ultimately depend on which 
agenda has asserted itself as the ultimate authority of the law. 
This holds true when we examine how legal English emerged as the administrative language in the 
fifteenth century. King Edward III’s political agenda “reinforced the sense – already powerful in England 
– that language was the primary marker of ‘national’ identity.”76 This led to the enactment of the Statute of 
Pleading in 1362: from that date onwards, English (not French) became the compulsory language of oral 
communication in all the courts of the land.77 This meant that the native legal language was a valid form 
of visualisation of the constitutional legal system, as well as a plausible “means of conducting effective oral 
business between justices, clerks, jurors, witnesses and defendants.”78 Paraphrasing Sherwin, we might say 
that, by enacting the Statute of Pleading, the law went pop, because the choice of English as the legal 
language showed how intense the overlapping between law and popular culture had always been in 
England. 
King Edward III’s nationalistic agenda was challenged by the powerful order of the coif, which 
gathered the sergeants-at-law, i.e., the conservators of legal knowledge that was practised, uttered, and 
performed in the courts in Law French. The order of the coif contrasted the king in order to preserve 
French as the formal language of pleading and of the law performed in the pragmatic context of trials. An 
elite thus tried to impose his agenda and language “as the authoritative medium of communication for all 
the common law courts.”79  
 
 
5. Visualising the Content of the Law: Power, Pragmatic Interactions, and the 
Development of Legal English  
 
English legal linguistics usually focuses on the role that governmental, i.e., royal, power played in the 
process of progressive affirmation of both standard legal language and meaning. As Frederick W. 
Maitland and Frederick Pollock highlight, “[t]he Norman Conquest [was] a catastrophe which determines 
the whole future history of English law,” a dramatic change in ideology and agenda, and in the legal 
language as a means for its visualisation and transmission.80 Norman rule, i.e., the new power, not only 
conveyed a new prescriptive meaning by enacting new provisions, it also modified the form (the lexicon, 
the grammar, and the syntax) that conveys the meaning and content of old English law. The Norman 
Conquest entailed, then, a replacement of both legal English morphology and semantics with their French 
counterparts, loans and derived words, which still pervade the body politic and the constitutional 
regime.81 
Such meaning and agenda may also stem from powers that are different form political and 																																																								
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governmental authorities. First, the meaning that law conveys may change over time. If we consider early 
modern legal language, we will realise that statutory law “displays the double form him or her.” 
 
Then everie person soe offending shall forfeyte and lose fower tymes the values of everie suche Cable so by him 
or her made or cause to be made as aforesaide […] 
 
Provided always neverthelesse That this Act shall not extend to any Person or Persons in Execution for any Fine 
on him her or them imposed for any Offence by him her or them committes […]82  
 
This usage – “which now could be motivated to avoid a gender bias” – was then “determined by the need 
to provide for all, as the use of the plural them is singled out separately.”83 The role of power is even more 
apparent if we consider that an act of parliament may impose new language policy, as occurred with the 
formal adoption of sex-indefinite he in 1850.84 
Second, the same addressees can change the language and meaning of the law, i.e., of a form and a 
function we are traditionally accustomed to considering as the outcome of the top-down process of 
dissemination. This is astutely pointed out by Matti Rissanen, who has examined the phraseology of the 
early statutes of the realm: whereas the statutes of the realm seem to develop the unmarked “neutral” 
future indication by resorting to shall, the “development of the standard followed the natural, spoken 
expression; it was influenced by change from below rather than by change from above.”85 
It is quite evident that the same means of communication, transmission, and recording of legal 
linguistic representation of the law may act as influential powers trying to confer their own meaning on 
patterns of legal visualisation. It is indisputable that these means of communication have their own 
“political,” “social,” and “economic” agenda, and that they therefore may be interested in manipulating, 
altering, or determining the authoritative meaning conveyed by legal language, and, ultimately, they aim to 
replace the meaning and policy set forth by the governmental, political power. 
Hence, legal linguists have to ascertain what the effective source of the authority and meaning of the 
law is. I prefer to label the ultimate source of law’s legitimacy as ideology rather than power. Indeed, 
ideology is a broader term encompassing all agents (political and non-political, governmental and non-
governmental, such as individuals, communities, lobbyists, economic powers) that may exert effective 
influence over the meaning of the law. This is due to the fact that legal linguists act as legal historical 
pragmatists:86 they examine the context of language use and “provide explanations for patterns of language 
change,” focussing on the “communicative context” in which such language change occurs.87 This also 
sheds light on how spelling in written language may be independent of meaning and therefore visualise 
different meanings of the law. Indeed, historical legal pragmatics also examines how old words and 
language visualisation of the law may cover new meanings: the process of semantic change affects existing 
lexemes because they adopt an additional meaning that complements the old one.88 And such changes 
are particularly relevant when modifications in lexicon, grammar, and syntax depend on the medium 
conveying the meaning of the legal discourse: the media may propose (and impose) such a change because 
they can turn the interactions between legal semantic knowledge and the knowledge of reality into a new 
meaning and into a new visualisation of the law. 
This kind of historical pragmatics may really contribute to the study of the language as a powerful 																																																								
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form of visualisation of the law. In this regard, it represents the diachronic part of legal linguistics – an 
intriguing study of how language discloses the impact of ideology on the law.89  
I now intend to propose the visualisation of the history of legal English. In this regard, three stages in 
the history of the English language will be examined (Late Middle English, Modern English, and 
Contemporary English) in order to detect which ideologies underpinned its evolution. Furthermore, we 
will liken each of these three stages to the three main parts of judicial proceedings: the writ, the courtroom 
trial, the judgement. These, indeed, will not only help us in complementing the linguistic change written 
English has undergone over the centuries, but they will also allow us to examine how the language has 
been used in a specific context, the trial, where law is both uttered and performed, i.e., takes on a form of 
visualisation that is different for the black-letter one.  
 
6. Visualisation as Standardisation: Hard-Copy Law and Middle Legal English 
 
The period in the history of English I consider first is late Middle English. This was a period of transition 
from Middle to Modern English, which historical linguists traditionally extend from the second half of the 
fourteenth century to the advent of the Tudors in 1485. 
Burrow and Turville-Petre exclude it from their anthologies of Middle English, because they consider 
that such dating is too indebted to non-linguistic considerations, such as the Kings’ linguistic policy and 
political agenda.90 However, it is evident that the “external aspects” of the history of English91 really affect 
both the features of the language, in general, and those inherent to English, in particular. Bearing in mind 
that legal language’s “aims may make [legal] language complex […], but they also make it innovative in 
some aspects of syntactic and lexical usage,” it follows that it may also exert influence on other textual 
genres: in legal documents written in late Middle English, linguistic aspects are “decontextualised and 
deregionalised […], and [this] marked these forms as part of the standard.”92 
From a linguistic point of view, this period marks a new stage in English legal linguistics: it experienced 
the reestablishment of English as the official language of the realm and its subsequent adoption by the 
national bureaucracy.93 Finally, the language for official writing caused a progressive shift towards the 
standardisation of the language. 
As far as legal visualisation is concerned, during the Middle Ages, the law was usually proclaimed, i.e., 
uttered, by the Kings assembled with barons and representatives of the commons and then written down. 
It is, then, a form of visualisation that rests on hard-copy law – the parchments upon which the late 
governmental power recorded the law of the land it had uttered and therefore performed. Such a form of 
visualisation is typical of a  
 
king ruling his people politically, because he himself is not able to change the laws without the assent of his 
subjects nor to burden an unwilling people with strange imposition, so that, ruled by laws that they themselves 
desire, they freely enjoy their goods, and are despoiled neither by their own king nor any other.94 
 
As a consequence, the legitimacy and sovereignty of the ancient English constitution entailed the idea of 
laws enacted in the best interests of English subjects and were strictly associated both with Aristotle’s 
“good governance” of the polis and with the constitution as a social contract based on the recognition of 
community, association or friendship for “the creation or maintenance of the polis” itself.95 																																																								
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It does not follow from this, however, that the law was confined to a merely hard-copy representation. 
By contrast, the “fountain of justice” disseminated its political will through legal proclamations that called 
for its declamation and enforcement in the realm and in courtrooms. 
This is clear as far as the beginning of trials are concerned: the count or declaration announced at the 
very beginning of the proceedings and that contains the formal statement of the case. I liken this period, 
which is legally and linguistically relevant, to the administration of justice. Indeed, the first two acts that 
attest to the reestablishment of the English language as the official language are related to both the issuing 
of writs and to the conduct of proceedings. First, the Provisions of Oxford 1258, which were issued—and 
this is significant—in Latin, French, and English,96 provided that no further expansion of the writs system 
would be allowed without the consent of the barons and the commons.97 Second, Henry III assented to 
a parliamentary petition in 1362 and enacted the Statute of Pleading:98 The statute was written in French 
and made “English, rather than French, the compulsory language of oral communication in all the courts 
of the land.”99 The establishment of English as the language of judicial proceedings did not prohibit the 
use of Law French: although English became the only plausible language for performing the law within 
the courts, it was impossible to completely dismantle a legal tradition that had rested on French and its 
legal terminology over the preceding three centuries.100 As a result, legal French still could be used, 
provided that “common-law writs [had to] clearly state the substance of the case.”101 
The relevance of the Provisions of Oxford and the Statute of Pleading were not limited to their nature as 
governmental acts regulating the issue of writs by the Chancery upon a plaintiff’s request.102 On the 
contrary, they implied the importance of written and spoken language as forms of the visualisation of the 
law. Not only did the hard-copy law sanction the use of English and record the joint utterance of both 
the King and the body politic, it also disseminated the performance – the proclamation of the law – 
through which governmental power set the authoritative meaning of the law: it offered the basis for its 
iconic representation in a trial: “the statute on the use of English in the law courts has taken on a kind of 
iconic significance in the world of linguistic and literary history.”103 
Furthermore, the reestablishment of English was not limited to the authoritative use of English. There 
are indeed several explicit references to English as a valid language in the operations of the central 
government of this period, and such references seem to hint at a clear royal agenda. To this extent, we can 
mention the earliest petitions to the King written in English, dating from 1344 and 1386: in addition to 
the Statute of Pleading, the opening speech of Parliament in 1362 was delivered in English.104 Furthermore, 
Henry IV accepted the throne and made a formal oral declaration in front of the same Parliament in 
1399,105 and the number of legal documents and parliamentary reports grew at a steady rate during the 
reign of Henry V, whose “use of English marks the turning point in establishing English as the national 
language of England.”106 As Fisher argues, 
 																																																								
96 See Fisher, The Emergence of Standard English, 22: The Provisions of Oxford are “the only royal document in English since the 
proclamation of William the Conqueror in 1087.” 
97 On the writ system, see Frederick W. Maitland’s seminal work The Forms of Actions at Common Law: A Course of Lectures, ed. 
A. H. Chaytor and W. J. Whittaker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936); H. A. Hollond, “Writs and Bills,” The 
Cambridge Law Journal 8.1 (1942): 15-35. 
98 Statutes of the Realm 1810-1828, 1.375-376. The original petition is in RP, II.273. 
99 Ormrod, “The Use of English,” 750. 
100 See E. J. Dobson, “Early Modern Standard English,” Transactions of the Philological Society 54.1 (1955): 25-54, 24 fn 1, which 
quotes a petition from Rotuli Parliamentorum II.173a (21 Edw. III (1347) 64) complaining about the presence of foreign clergy 
who could not speak English.  
101 It “implicitly defended the continued use of Latin forms in writing and of French forms in oral proceedings as the best 
means of guaranteeing the interests of the parties”: Ormrod, “The Use of English,” 773. 
102 On the development of the Chancery jurisdiction from seeking remedies requested by petitioners, see James F. Baldwin, 
“The King’s Council and the Chancery, II,” The American Historical Review 15.4 (1910): 744-761; P. Tucker, “The Early History 
of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study,” English Historical Review 115 (463) (2000): 791-811. 
103 Ormrod, “The Use of English,” 752, 782. 
104 See RP II.268. See Fisher, The Emergence of Standard English, 22. argue that, under the Statute 36 Edw. III. Stat. i. c. 15, oral 
discussions must be recorded in Latin. See Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, I.83 
105 RP 3.422-423. 
106 Fisher, The Emergence of Standard English, 22. 
The first English entry in the Rotuli Parliamentorum is the 1388 petition of the Mercer’s guild (RP 111.225) […] 
In 1397 the address of Judge Rikhill concerning the impeachment of Gloucester is recorded in English (RP 
111.378). Chief Justice Thirnyng’s two speeches regarding the deposition of Richard II and accession of Henry 
IV and Henry’s own challenge to the throne in 1399 are in English (RP 111.424, 451, 453).107  
 
Several authors contend John H. Fisher’s assumption: “the transformation of the language of 
government and business would not have been possible without more than a decade of preparation and 
propaganda,” as well as of a social network “to which scriveners belonged in fifteenth-century 
London.”108 Despite this, however, Edward III, Henry IV, and Henry V did encourage the use of English, 
and this encouragement hinted at the implicatures that we have already called the King’s agenda.109 This 
agenda was the outcome of what historical linguists call the “nationalistic” ideology of the kings – among 
them, Henry V – which sponsored English as the official language of bureaucracy, legislation, and 
administration of justice, and his Signet Office, “the king’s private secretariat which travelled with him on 
his foreign campaigns.”110 
Henry V’s policy reflected political and practical motives: by writing in English,  
 
Henry first and foremost identified himself as an Englishman at war with France, while at the same time seeking 
to carry favour with the English-speaking merchants, who might be prevailed upon to finance his campaigns.111  
 
This nationalistic ideology had deep roots. First, the loss of Normandy (1204) accentuated the 
“Englishness” of the nobility of Anglo-Norman origins. 112  There was then a series of civil and 
international wars, which triggered the “emergence of linguistic nationalism,” as evinced by its “repeated 
use to whip up parliamentary support for the continuing war with France, that a French victory would 
annihilate the English language.”113 This is particularly true when it comes to Henry V’s invasion of 
France (1417): the king adopted English in order to secure popular support for this military expedition.114  
His linguistic policy bore fruit: after Henry V’s death, the entries in the Rotuli Parliamentorum in English 
increased: 
 
There are English entries in 1403, 1404, 1405, 1411, and 1414 (two), and two from the last Parliament of Henry 
V in 1421. But beginning with 1422, the first year of the reign of the infant King Henry VI, English entries 
begin to be more frequent, and by 1450 they are the rule.115 
 
It is thus evident that there are strong connections between the King’s ideology, the reestablishment 
of English, and the revival of the legal language. In this respect, the process of standardisation is the 
outcome of a deliberate policy of governmental power. In addition,  
 
there were good reasons why the technical terms of the old English law should be preserved if the king could 
preserve them. They were the terms that defined his royal rights.116  
 
Furthermore, the body politic is completely represented and “visualised” in Parliament: the overlapping 
of linguistics, law, and territory are manifest in the parliamentary representation of counties and 
boroughs, i.e., the units of medieval constitutional English legal geography. This had repercussions on 
how the first representative institutions of the realm and their electoral systems were shaped. England 																																																								
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established a strong connection between the Crown, the land, the community, and the law, and allowed 
territorial interests to be represented within Parliament: “every acre of English soil and every proprietary 
right therein have brought within the compass of a single formula, which may be expressed thus: Z tenet 
terram illam de […] domino Rege.”117  
To this extent, the line between legislation and the administration of justice was not clearly drawn in 
late Middle English. Both the courts of law and Parliament originated from the magnum concilium,118 and 
“a large part of the work of the ‘Parliament’ was what we should call ‘judicial’, consisting of those cases 
that had proved too hard or too novel for the judges in the separate courts.”119 The interrelations between 
the judicial and legislative functions were then manifold in the representation of the law and in conveying 
its authoritative meaning. On the one hand, the process of standardising the language began long before 
the division of the administrative and judicial functions of both the Chancery and Parliament was 
eventually drawn; 120  on the other hand, the functions of Parliament as an “extraordinary court of 
justice”121 made it possible to preserve a similar role for both Parliament and the courts: that of an “act” 
and a “place” where the law is discussed, debated, proclaimed, and recorded.122 
This linguistic process led to the recognition of English as a medium through which the nation could 
be governed by selecting “the kind of English that was to serve as a reference dialect in the [same process 
of] standardisation of the written language.”123 This was also due to the absence of a clear division 
between judicial and political branches: the kings were thus able to impose their agenda via the mediaeval 
administration that emanated from its household,124 the Chancery and the Parliament they summoned, 
and this implied a great deal of work to be done by the Chancery clerks.125  
The clerks thus implemented the kings’ agenda, contributed to the nationalistic policy, and, by 
upholding the revival of English, disseminated the authoritative will of the King, the courts, and the body 
politic summoned in Parliament. Hence, they played a crucial role in the standardisation of the language: 
they received the petitions sent to the King; they subsequently embellished and polished those destined 
for Parliament. They were a group “engaged in their most formal and meticulous task of enrolling the 
acts of Parliament for posterity, their hands were more careful and their forms more nearly like [the] 
modern written standard.”126 
The consequences are threefold. First, through the hard-copy legal language, the clerks conveyed a 
pictorial representation of English society: “many of the petitions,” i.e., of the bottom-up attempts to 
influence the governmental policy and agenda, “provide dramatic vignettes of 15th-century life.” 127 
Second, the  																																																								
117 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, I.232.  
118 See Charles H. McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1910), 16-17. 
119 McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament, 25. This is apparent as far as the House of Lords is concerned. Although it preserved 
its jurisdiction (see McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament, 32), the role of ideology and Chancery in forging legal English is 
outward: the clerks standardised English because issuing writs for the people who sought amelioration of the laws from the 
King, and, at the same time, they were members of the King’s courts and attended the House of Lords, advising it as regards 
legislation. 
120 On Chancery as “a department of government descended from the Anglo-Saxon scriptorium, [which] had custody of the 
great seal of England, which was used to authenticate the instruments that his office prepared,” see Timothy S. Haskett, “The 
Medieval English Court of Chancery,” Law and History Review 14.2 (1996): 245-313, 246, 248, 249. See also McIlwain, The High 
Court of Parliament, 31. 
121 According to Fisher, Richardson, and Fisher, An Anthology, 20, “[t]he ancient Petitions to Parliament and Parliamentary 
Proceedings are petitions presented to the Parliament and actions upon these petitions.” On the Parliament as an extraordinary 
court of justice, see McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament, and Francis Palgrave, An Essay Upon the Original Authority of the King’s 
Council (London: command of His Majesty King William IV under the direction of the Commissioners on the public records 
of the Kingdom, 1834). 
122 See McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament, 30. 
123 Nevalainen, An Introduction to early Modern English, 30. 
124 Georges Sayles, “The Household of the Chancery,” The Scottish Historical Review 25.98 (1928), 109-113. See also L. B. 
Dibben, “Secretaries in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries,” The English Historical Review 25.99 (1910): 430-444. 
125 See Ormrod, “The Use of English,” 757. On clerks’ service in attending in the upper house of Parliament, see also James 
R Bryant, “The Office of Master in Chancery: Early English Development,” American Bar Association Journal 40.6 (1954): 498-
501, 500. 
126 Fisher, Richardson, and Fisher, An Anthology, 25. 
127 Fisher, Richardson, and Fisher, An Anthology, 22 note 19. 
 
increasing elaboration and precision in petitions, the growth, in fact, of a petitioner diplomatic, were due to the 
fact that it was becoming more difficult to secure an answer.128 
 
And therefore petitions to Parliament required the emergence of a uniform style and a standard prose. 
Indeed, not all the petitions were rewritten and transcribed in Chancery standard and with Chancery hand 
by the clerks. An increasing number of petitions were indeed “made with the exactitude and care of a 
legal document”: if a petitioner saw to it that his petition was sufficiently accurate, there was a “danger 
of it being delayed and ignored.”129 Third, the commons accepted the top-down nationalistic royal agenda 
that conveyed the standardised usage of the English language and its representation within the 
parliamentary political branch.130 In this regard, Henry V’s concerns about the creation of an official 
language for the realm match the body politic’s will: one of the first acts of his reign was his assent to a 
petition asking not to change the language in which petitions were written.131 
The language of the Signet Letters of Henry V is also close to Chancery standard. This attests to the 
contribution of the King to the standardisation of the legal language, but it also sheds light on the 
influence it exerted on the literary language, an influence that was due to the fact that the King, Chaucer, 
Lydgate, and Gower were part of the same legal and cultural milieu, as the portraits in the 1410 Bedford 
Psalter confirm.132 
 
7. Visualisation as Performance: Illustrated Courtroom Discourse in Modern 
English and Its Simplification 
 
The above reference to the Statute of Pleading is an introduction to the second stage in the development 
of the legal language, the stage when Middle English was developing into Modern English. The stage 
corresponds to the “general process undertaken before the bench of oral argument between the 
representatives of the parties to the suit.”133 The Statute of Pleading referred to English as the language of 
oral communication for all judicial proceedings: pleas were also to be “pleaded,” “counted,” “defended,” 
“answered,” “debated,” and judged” in English. Latin and Law French challenged the place of English 
until the seventeenth century, and Law French was dislodged by 1731, when it lost its place to late 
Modern English.134 
What is really relevant is the persistence of the jargon of the courts: the performance of spoken 
utterances remained incomprehensible to those without knowledge of the law. And the reasons for this 
are intimately connected with ideology and its linguistic and pictorial representation. 
As far as representation of the law is concerned, the language of judicial proceedings is entrusted with 
the conveyance of a specific ideology. Before the Glorious Revolution, the ideology it conveyed was part 
of the attempts on the part of the Tudors and the Stuarts, on the one hand, and the Radical and Puritan 
wings, on the other, to challenge the common-law constitution. 																																																								
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In this respect, the embarrassment, steadily growing among scholars, regarding the absolutist trend 
of the late era of Elizabethan rule, was even greater after James I’s accession to the throne. On the one 
hand, not only had the myth of Astraea, which was traditionally associated with the person of Elizabeth 
I, been employed in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus to represent justice abandoning the Earth (p. 23ff.), 
but, on the other hand, such an absolutist trend appears to be even more disquieting in “[t]reason and 
other politically motivated trials […]across” the seventeenth century.135 The same linguistic patterns are 
even more capable of capturing the new ideology, as in Raleigh’s trial: 
 
Raleigh. I do not hear yet, that you have spoken one word against me; here is no Treason of mine done: if my 
Lord Cabham be a Traitor, what is that to me? 
Attorney. All that he did was thy Instigation, thou Viper; for I thou thee, thou Traitor.136 
 
Historical pragmaticists would expect that the representation of the law within courtrooms should follow 
grammatical rules. By contrast, the law as performed matches the ideology and reveals the agenda of 
governmental power: the records thus visualise the new equilibrium in the exercise of power, a new 
equilibrium that reveals the presence of the body politic as a new sovereign, which is even more apparent 
in the trial and execution of Charles I mentioned above.  
The necessity of conveying the new ideology through language turns the use of pronouns from 
semantics and sociolinguistics to pragmatics: what is really relevant is the vivid and precise representation 
of power, the necessity of capturing the spontaneous speech of the people. This concern is fully attained 
after the Glorious Revolution. The supremacy of the fundamental law of the land was restored on the 
basis of the constitutional principle of mixed government and on a contractual basis. From that time 
onwards, English political power has been rooted in the consent of the people. To sum up, the restoration 
of the English constitutional identity exhibits a high degree of adaptation of English legal tradition, since 
it  
 
emphasized the need to balance and calibrate the distinct elements in the English polity, rather than appealing 
primarily to its antiquity.137 
 
This implies that spoken courtroom discourse has to give the impression of real speech, and that records 
must match the way the law has been effectively performed. Discourse also requires that remedies be 
granted according to the law of the land, and be expressed in a precise the legal language, a controlled 
instrument capable of expressing the nuances of the pleading and of contributing to giving a vivid 
impression of a spontaneous utterance.138 The jargon of law is, then, a prerequisite for both good 
governance and preservation of the ancient English common-law constitution. This is apparent if we 
consider that “Trials texts became more frequently after 1640,” as the Corpus of English Dialogues 
upholds.139 Such an ideal constitution is founded upon both the unwritten authority of precedent and the 
immemorial antiquity of common customary law, and it guarantees fundamental freedoms to English 
subjects. Moreover, the idea of good governance evokes another principle of the ancient common-law 
constitution upon which the most important common-law jurists from Bracton onwards agreed that the 
King himself was subject to the law, as interpreted by his judges. This is the  
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lex terrae: the unwritten constraints of the ancient constitution, the immemorial suprema lex or common law, 
whose jurisdiction is unchallengeable and whose judges are the ultimate arbiters of juridical disputes.140 
 
Courtroom discourse thus requires resort to a detailed, accurate, and exact technical legal language that 
has proven to be capable of capturing and conveying all the peculiarities and minor features of the 
pleading. This establishes an equivalence between the language used and the typical pictorial 
representations of Anglo-American courtrooms: these are the traditional “illustrated courtrooms,” where 
art, law, and news merge and convey the content of the law, thus offering an expressive rendering of the 
law as performed in front of the bar.141 
The art of illustrating courtrooms perfectly matches the subtleties of the detailed legal lexicon, 
grammar, and phraseology.142 In this regard, it complements the way language represented legal language 
in the early Modern English period. Legal jargon was indeed based on legal French, and this required a 
careful translation of terms: “legal terms became more accessible to law students and lay people alike 
with the publication of the first English law dictionary,”143 John Rastell’s Expsiciones terminorum legume 
anglorum (1560), which went through thirty editions in the course of 300 years. And the same holds true 
for Abraham Fraunce’s The Lawiers Logike (1588) and John Cowell’s Interpreter: Or Booke Containig the 
Signification of Words […] requiring any Exposition or Interpretation (1607), with the latter offering several 
etymologies of legal terms.144 
In addition, this rigorous pictorial representation of the law perfectly corresponds to the authoritative 
meaning the governmental power conveyed through the law after the Glorious Revolution. From a 
linguistic point of view, the sovereign is now the King in Parliament, a new sovereign. Indeed, “Liberty 
is to be supposed,” and “in cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the liberty 
to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion.”145 It follows that the legal language must complement 
such a politics of liberty (Lee Ward), setting precise rules and limits on power, which, under the rule of 
law, “is not able to change the laws without the assent of his subjects.”146  
Thus, the rule of law still rests on the immemorial antiquity of the law of the land. However,  
 
the Liberty of Man, in Society, is to be under no other Legislative Power, but that established, by consent, in the 
Commonwealth, nor under the Dominion of any will, or Restraint of any Law, but what the legislative shall enact, 
according to the Trust put in it.147  
 
When it comes to visualising the meaning of the law, the consequences are twofold. As a part of the 
public corporation, the law coincides with the supremacy of Parliament: the King rules his people 
politically and is therefore represented in Parliament. As the fountain of justice, the King enforces the 
law, i.e., performs its meaning, judicially148; the law is proclaimed, i.e. uttered, and courtroom discourse 
is the main form of its visualisation.   
After the Glorious Revolution, the role of the press as a medium for the propagation of the 
authoritative meaning of the law grew at a steady rate.149 Not only was the law proclaimed and performed 																																																								
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in Parliament and within courtrooms, but newspapers, which contributed to the formation of public 
opinion, also disseminated it. It is evident that, under the influence of these new modes of transmission, 
legal language could also grow distorted. Indeed, the press acted not only as a means of mass 
communication, devoted particularly to news books and pamphlets, but also as a pattern conveying a 
meaning-making practice alternative to the governmental one. Furthermore, the advent of the first forms 
of mass media affected the same language, which abandoned the technicalities and subtleties of the 
professional language and favoured resort to a plain variety of the English language. 150  This was 
functional for both the creation of common political speech: the simplification of the patterns of the 
visualisation of the law insinuated alternative ideologies that undermined those authoritatively conveyed 
by the King acting politically through Parliament and judicially through the courts. 
To sum up, illustrated courtrooms, legal advertisements, and news disseminated by the mass media 
adopt a synthetic language that is accessible to the public where the meaning of a prescriptive utterance 
is not determined solely by lawmakers, judges, and scholars. Professional jargon is thus generated and 
spread by the mass media to suit the audience’s average language and knowledge of legal technicalities. 
We may say that legal language has undergone a process of simplification, where the meaning and context 
channel and structure an alternative “top-down process” for diffusion of their own agenda, which also 
influence the ultimate prescriptive meaning of legal statements.  
 
8. Visualisation as Dissolution: A New Pragmatics for the “Digital Baroque” Era 
 
The role the mass media play in the dissemination of law’s authoritative meaning is even more remarkable 
in the ultimate stage of the language and of judicial proceedings. This is the phase of contemporary 
English and the end of the trial, when the judgement is rendered. 
On the one hand, English is now a global language. It is, then, the language through which, as Sherwin 
highlights, the  
 
technologies of digital imaging, interacting, computing, and instant access to an almost infinite flow of 
information online are likewise giving rise to new communities’ institutions, and practices, including the 
communities’ institutions and practice of law (DB, 2).  
 
The jargon of the law has ceased to be the language of the courtroom. The stream of visual 
communication has turned the World Wide Web into a gigantic digital court, where everyone has access 
to a huge quantity of data, images, facts, and news, which may be adjudged. In this court, an initial 
judgement of “an image can be strategically used to wash over and inform the way we construe the images 
that follow” (LP, 33). We are free to act as jurors and to compulsively view videos and other iconic images 
related to legal storytelling. However, the consequences of this type of electronically mediated 
communication and proliferation of news channels151 are twofold: on the one hand, legal language has 
experienced the “judicial control” of grammar checkers, which impose their own linguistic rules; on the 
other hand, as Sherwin emphasises,  
 
[w]hen law lives as an image on the screen [the web] the aesthetic forms, interpretive methods, and narrative content of 
popular visual entertainment inevitably finds their way into the courtroom (DB, 1).  
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This digitally image-based arena is the place where, unlike artefacts, digital judgements are rendered, made 
real, thus distorting reality. Indeed, “[t]he shape and texture of the legal imagination itself – how we think 
and feel and deliberate about truth and justice – are undergoing radical change” (LP, 1). 
Digital law is thus a new form of visualisation of the law, which requires a new type of legal linguistics 
and a renewed attitude in the field of historical pragmatics. What has undergone huge changes is the 
ideology that supports the legitimacy of the law. Powerful new means of communication are changing 
the way law’s authoritative meaning and content are conveyed. Like Baroque art, digital law “is hyper-
positive law, law cut off from nature or from essences of any kind” (DB, 8): there’s no Chancery, Kings, 
God, assembled communities, nor is there the possibility of disseminating counterarguments or counter-
ideologies. Digital law is indeed a sequence of algorithmic-oriented images; the legitimacy and 
adjudication of the law depend only on how many “connected” people from the public visualise it. To 
put it differently, “law’s legitimacy only arises from the public’s acceptance of its commands, and of its 
right to command in the first place” (DB, 8-9).  
Like Baroque art, digital law’s hyper-positivism is pure ornamentation and rhetoric: an ostensible 
vacuum that cannot be administered. Spoken or written standard legal English loses its ability to be 
visualised and represented, because this ostensible vacuum dematerialises language, power, iconology, the 
concrete character of writing, and the spatiality of the practice of law: “the anxiety that accompanies 
baroque visuality […] is at the bottom a fear of the loss of meaning, and the uncanny presence of the 
visual sublime […] frame the contemporary, culture-wide quest for visual competence” (DB, 4).  
As a consequence, we must visualise digital law in order to accept its authoritative command. The 
digital Baroque offers several mechanisms for such representation, including social media. I will now 
refer to Twitter, which constitutional courts and supreme courts use as a type of press release for their 
judgements. 
This topic is particularly contentious and troublesome, as we do not really know how this digital form 
of the visualisation of the law will affect the establishment of the meaning of the law in the future. 
Nevertheless, social media do actually affect the law. First, there is the dissolution of the legal language: 
this is not simplification stemming from a top-down counter-ideology, the 140-character bursts of 
information called tweets imply a manifest change in how to release news about the most recent decisions 
– this is not plain language, but a new legal one, whose linguistic rules must be consistent with the medium 
of communication and the purposes of the social communication Twitter conveys. 152  Second, the 
dissolution of the traditional legal language implies the dissolution of traditional ideologies that used to 
determine both the agenda and the meaning of the law. By contrast, governmental and judicial powers 
now compete in order to have their decisions visualised: the number of followers and visualisations define 
a new meaning-making process that disregards both traditional (political and judicial) processes and those 
related to globalised financial dominance.  
Like countries, whose sustainability is now traded in global equity markets and subsequently enforced 
under private-law mechanisms,153 Twitter crosses the public-private divide: courts compete with actors, 
private individuals, and firms in a conundrum of visualisations. Digital law exists and is accepted provided 
that the public accepts and visualises it. This determines the dissolution of the forms of legal historical 
pragmatics we have experienced in past centuries. The authoritative meaning of the law is thus in a state 
of flux and is awaiting the next visualisation and the next “like” in a world of anxiety. And this anxiety 
depends on the fact that the lexical items of legal discourse are not defined in terms of predictability, i.e., 
legal certainty, which has always been the very rationale of a power ruling politically and enforcing 
judicially the authoritative meaning it visualises through the law.  
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